In this position paper we advocate so ware model checking as a technique suitable for security analysis of mobile apps. Our recommendation is based on promising results that we achieved on analysing app collusion in the context of the Android operating system. Broadly speaking, app collusion appears when, in performing a threat, several apps are working together, i.e., they exchange information which they could not obtain on their own. In this context, we developed the K-Android tool, which provides an encoding of the Android/Smali code semantics within the K framework. KAndroid allows for so ware model checking of Android APK les.
Introduction
We advocate as a promising research direction: applying so ware model checking to Android apps for formal security analysis. is uses abstract model checking, which is an abstract interpretation technique. Here, we have already achieved a number of explorative results. ese include: de ning and experimenting with two executable semantics on the byte-code level, one concrete and one abstract. Both of them have been implemented in the K-Android tool [4, 7] , utilising the K framework [12] where Java/JVM semantics had already been de ned [6] . Our work targets however the byte-code level and Android operating system (ART/Dalvik); the work-ow of K-Android is described in Fig. 1 . Currently we are * is work was funded by EPSRC and received advice from Erwin R. Catesbeiana (Jr).
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In the followings we discuss a number of decisions underlying the suggested approach, give a brief status report on our research, and conclude by providing some insights that we gained.
Related work: Our work is closest to static analysis tools that detect security properties in Android. For example, the tool FlowDroid [3] uses taint analysis to nd connections between source and sink. e app inter-component communication pa ern is subsequently analysed using a composite constant propagation technique [11] . We propose a similar approach, namely to track (sensitive) information ow and to detect app communication, but using model checking that gives witness traces in case of collusion detection. From the proof e ort perspective, we mention CompCert [9] that uses Coq theorem prover to validate a C compiler. Also, an up-to-date survey on app collusion in Android can be found in [5] .
Decisions
When se ing up our framework for so ware model checking, we took a number of decisions that we conceive to be fundamental:
Verify byte-code rather than high level language programs When considering the language level, the input language of the virtual machine appears to be the right level for investigating security properties. Users download their apps as APKs hence this needs to be the starting point for our investigation. Decompiling APKs is a possibility however not 100% successful. A further advantage is that a language such as Smali, which was designed to run on a Virtual Machine, is far less complex than a high-level language such as Java. Finally, Smali programs are independent of compiler optimisations: veri cation addressing speci c Java constructs might fail on the byte code level as compiler optimisations might interfere.
O er two semantics: a concrete and an abstract one We believe it to be essential to work with two di erent semantics. Objectives of formulating a concrete semantics include:
C-O1 To be close to the informal description of the language instructions to ease modelling. For Android these are Smali instructions as speci ed on the Android Project website [1] . C-O2 To work with actual values as much as possible: this allows to experiment with small example programs in order to validate the given semantics. Note that the K framework allows for executable speci cations. Objectives of formulating an abstract semantics include:
A-O1 To enable e ective model checking by selecting suitable abstraction principles. In K-Android we have chosen:
• virtual unrolling: this leads to nite ows [10] ;
• memory abstraction: to reduce the state space [2] ;
• constant propagation: this abstracts from concrete values and thus also helps in reducing the state space [8] . A-O2 To be sound w.r.t. the security property under discussion, in our case: collusion.
Provide a soundness proof In order to certify the correctness of the overall approach, a soundness proof is needed. ough the e ort required in carrying out such a proof might appear as a high price to pay, the overall setup has a number of advantages:
• e proof is done once; the savings of the abstract semantics in time and space apply every time model checking is carried out; moreover, the proof is re-usable as it is structured according to classes of Smali instructions -even when changing the property, the abstract semantics for some of these classes would stay the same.
• Working with a single semantics confuses objectives, namely to be true to the informal descriptions (c.f. C-O1 and C-O2) and, at the same time to be e ective (c.f. A-O1). is confusion might compromise the overall objective of providing a reliable analysis tool (c.f. A-O2).
3 Current Status of our work In our tool K-Android [4, 7] , we implement experimental versions of a concrete and an abstract semantics, which both cover the whole Smali language-see Figure 2 for the chosen module structure. We have successfully applied our tool to a number of Android apps to analyse them for collusion. Here, the counter-example traces provided by the model checking give good guidance for the codeanalysis that distinguishes between collusion and false positives.
Our correctness proof is "well on its way"-we covered the core constructs, e.g., method calls and returns. Although the sheer number of cases to consider (Smali has about 220 instructions) makes the proof time consuming, we classi ed the instructions in about 20 groups that share a similar build.
is modularisation provides the proof with exibility and reusability characteristics.
First insights
Concerning the question if it would be possible to directly build a suitable abstract semantics, our experience suggests that the two step approach including a proof is a necessity. In our ongoing proof, we learned that in some cases our originally implemented semantics went wrong. Re ecting on the abstraction via a formal simulation relation helped us to nd the correct semantic clauses.
Concerning the applicability of our approach, experiments with our concrete and abstract semantics indicate that, provided an astute abstraction, so ware model checking for security is feasible and might even scale even for demanding properties as collusion.
Conclusion
Our ongoing work demonstrates that so ware model checking is a viable technique for analysing mobile apps for security. Veri cation times are below a minute for small examples consisting of about 5K lines of Smali code. e concrete semantics provided as well as the abstraction principles applied can be re-used to investigate further security properties. ough K-Android is tailored to the Android operating system, the concepts in other mobile operating systems such as Symbian, MeeGo, iOS, Android, Tizen, etc. appear to be similar enough that it should be possible to apply so ware model checking also in their context. Compared to the predominant static analysis methods traditionally applied in mobile security veri cation, especially the possibility to obtain counter-example traces makes so ware model checking a promising approach.
